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Abstract
Judgment aggregation theory studies how to amal-
gamate individual opinions on a set of logically re-
lated issues into a set of collective opinions. Ag-
gregation rules proposed in the literature are sparse.
All proposed rules consider only two-valued judg-
ments, thus imposing the strong requirement that
an agent cannot abstain from giving judgments on
any of the issues. All proposed rules are also in-
sensitive to weights that can be assigned to differ-
ent judgments. We construct a family of weight-
sensitive rules for aggregating individual judgment
sets with abstentions. We do so by generalizing
known distance-based judgment aggregation rules.
We study the relations between existing distance-
based rules and the rules we propose and the com-
putational complexity of the winner determination
problem.
1 Introduction
The theory of judgment aggregation studies the problem
of aggregating individual answers to a set of binary in-
terconnected questions, called an agenda. The answers,
i.e., judgments, given on some of the questions constrain the
judgments that can consistently be given to others. Conse-
quently, an agreement on the collective set of answers cannot
always be reached by statistical pooling, one-by-one, the in-
dividual judgments [List and Polak, 2010].
Judgment aggregation is a relatively new field of social
choice and it has been predominantly focused on studying
the (im)possibility of rules for aggregation with respect to
the fairness rules they can simultaneously satisfy. Few judg-
ment aggregation rules have been constructed: the premise-
based procedure, proposed in [Kornhauser and Sager, 1993]
as “issue-by-issue voting” and studied in [Dietrich and Mon-
gin, 2010; Mongin, 2008], sequential procedures [List, 2004;
Dietrich and List, 2007; Li, 2010], and distance-based merg-
ing procedures [Pigozzi, 2006; Miller and Osherson, 2009;
Endriss et al., 2010]. All of these aggregation rules are de-
fined for complete sets of judgments, i.e., the agents are not
allowed to abstain from judgment. Furthermore, all the pro-
posed rules satisfy the property of anonymity. The outcome of
an anonymous aggregation rule depends only on the judgment
sets being aggregated but not on the identity of the source or
the nature of the agenda element. We argue that the proposed
rules as such are insufficient to cover all judgment aggrega-
tion scenarios.
Consider a team that has to determine whether to purchase
a new production robot.1 The team makes the decision based
on several factors such as: is the price affordable, is the robot
production capacity adequate, is the robot easy to manipu-
late, etc. The team consists of a design engineer, a manager
of the production unit that will use the robot, a purchasing
agent, and a person who will be trained to operate the robot.
The agents have different areas of expertise and each can ad-
dress different domains of the purchasing problem. For in-
stance, the design engineer can justifiably choose not to make
a judgment on whether the robot is easy to manipulate, while
the purchasing agent and the line manager may have differ-
ent views about how important the price is, even if they have
access to the same information.
In situations like this, not all team members need to give
their judgments on all the agenda elements. The expertise of
the agents may be distributed over the team members with no
one member possessing all the relevant information. Further-
more, even when team members make judgments on the same
agenda element, they may weigh their judgments differently.
The aggregation of their judgments should account for ab-
stentions, but also for different weights assigned to different
judgments. The judgment aggregation rules proposed in the
literature are not weight-sensitive and they are not designed
to handle abstentions. The aim of this paper is to contribute
towards filling this gap.
Frameworks of judgment aggregation in which agents are
allowed to abstain from giving some judgments have been
proposed in [Ga¨rdenfors, 2006; Dokow and Holzman, 2010],
but no aggregation rules were given. The challenge in ag-
gregating three-valued judgments is in the decision on how
to treat the case when an agent chooses to make no judg-
ment. The abstentions can be interpreted along two dimen-
sions, that of semantics and that of relation between absten-
tions and judgments. Abstaining can mean that the agent does
not have enough information to make a judgment at present,
that he thinks that a judgment cannot be made on that partic-
ular agenda element or maybe that he deems his opinion ir-
1This example is taken from [Ilgen et al., 1991]
relevant. The chosen semantics of the abstention determines
when a set of judgments that contains abstentions is consis-
tent.
The second dimension of interpretation is the relation be-
tween an abstention regarding an agenda element and the
judgments on that element. For instance, is the abstention an
independent position in addition to “yes” and “no”, or is it the
half-way position between “yes” and “no”? The relation be-
tween abstentions and judgments determines the impact that
abstentions have on which collective judgment is selected.
There are several possibilities. Consider, for example, seven
agents judging an issue p. Four of the agents abstain from
making a judgment, two judge “yes” and one judges “no”.
On one hand, the collective judgment for p should be “yes”
because this is the position of the majority of the agent’s who
do make a judgment. On the other hand, the majority of the
agents abstain so the group should also abstain from giving a
collective judgment on p.
In addition to rules that handle abstentions, we want to
construct weight-sensitive rules. The only trivially weight-
sensitive judgment aggregation rule considered in the liter-
ature is the dictatorship rule. Outside of judgment aggre-
gation, weights associated with an agent have been consid-
ered in merging information by [Revesz, 1995], and we take
the same approach. However, in addition to agent-associated
weights, we also consider weights associated with a judg-
ment, thus assigned to a (judgment, agenda element) pair.
We develop our rules by generalizing the distance min-
imization approach to judgment aggregation since this ap-
proach is applicable to any agenda.2 In contrast, the sequen-
tial aggregation rules are applicable only when there is a to-
tal order over the elements of the agenda, while the premise-
based approach is applicable when the agenda can be parti-
tioned to a set of premises and a set of conclusions. Moreover,
as we show, the premise-based approach can be emulated by
a distance-based aggregation rule.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we give
the necessary preliminaries. In Section 3 the distance-based
rules with abstentions are presented, and in Section 4 we pro-
pose the weight-sensitive version of these rules. In Section 5
we discuss the introduced rules and the computational com-
plexity of the winner determination problem. In Section 6 we
present our conclusions.
2 Preliminaries
There are two types of judgment aggregation frameworks:
logic-based, [Dietrich, 2007], and abstract algebraic, [Rubin-
stein and Fishburn, 1986; Dokow and Holzman, 2010]. In a
logic-based framework, the agenda is a set of formulas from
a given logic. The agenda is closed under negation and a
judgment set in this framework is a consistent subset of the
agenda. In an abstract framework no agenda is given, instead,
the agents choose from a set of allowed binary sequences. For
2Note that aggregating multi-valued information by distance
based merging has been already considered in the literature [Con-
dotta et al., 2008; Coste-Marquis et al., 2007], but only outside of
judgment aggregation.
example, if the agenda of the aggregation problem, in propo-
sitional logic, were {p,¬p, p → q,¬(p → q), q,¬q}, then
the corresponding set of allowed sequences in an abstract
framework would be {〈0, 1, 0〉, 〈0, 1, 1〉, 〈1, 0, 0〉, 〈1, 1, 1〉}.
E.g., {¬p, p → q, q} is a judgment set for this agenda but
{p, p→ q,¬q} is not.
Abstentions can be represented in several ways depend-
ing on the framework used. In a propositional logic frame-
work, one can introduce a new agenda element p for each
pair {p,¬p} to represent “the agent makes no judgment on p”
while imposing the additional consistency constraints to de-
note that neither {p, p} nor {p,¬p} are consistent sets. With
this approach there is no need to extend the existing judgment
aggregation rules and one can skip directly to constructing
weight-sensitive rules. However, adding agenda elements in
this way, as we show in Section 5, taxes the time it takes to
compute the collective judgment set. [Dokow and Holzman,
2010] use a special symbol ∗, which is interpreted as a vari-
able taking values from {0, 1}, to represent abstentions in an
abstract aggregation framework. This approach, as is the case
with any abstract argumentation framework, requests for all
of the allowed judgment sets to be explicitly given. The num-
ber of possible judgment sequences is exponential with re-
spect to the cardinality of the sequences considered and taxes
the space it takes to compute the collective judgment set.
We choose to use a ternary logic-based framework, in
which the consistency of a judgment set is determined by a
consequence relation. This allows us to keep the agenda as
a set not closed under negation, and removes the need for all
of the allowed judgment sets, or sequences, to be explicitly
stated and stored.
2.1 Ternary logic framework
The choice of a three-valued logic determines the seman-
tics of the abstention. In the ternary logic of Łukasiewicz,
[Łukasiewicz, 1920; Urquhart, 2001], the third value is 12 , set
in the middle of 0, i.e., “false” and 1, i.e., “true”. This third
value denotes “to be determined later”. The Łukasiewicz se-
mantics corresponds to the semantics of the symbol ∗ used
by [Dokow and Holzman, 2010]. In the ternary logic of
Kleene, [Kleene, 1938], the values that a formula can take
are {T, I, F}, where the third value I denotes “undefined”,
for this logic also the numerical value set {0, 12 , 1} is used
with I ≡ 12 . In the context of judgment aggregation, the “to
be determined later” means that when an agent is abstaining
it is because he does not know the value of the agenda ele-
ment at the moment of casting judgment, “undefined” means
that the abstaining agent does not think that a judgment on
the agenda element can be made. Other choices for ternary
logics can also be made. For instance, the ternary logic of
Bochvar interprets the third value as “meaningless” and any
formula that has a meaningless component as meaningless,
[Urquhart, 2001].
The choice of semantics can be based on the aggregation
context in which the rule is used. For instance, the logic of
Łukasiewicz is better suited to dynamic aggregation contexts
in which agents give judgments to the same agenda several
times, since the agents can make a judgment on p in the sec-
ond round, even though they abstained in the firs. For the
same reason, the Kleene logic can be considered suited for
aggregation problems in which the judgments are made only
once.
We give a short overview of the logics of Kleene and
Łukasiewicz. The syntax of the both of propositional logic
(in BNF) LProp :
ϕ ::= > | ⊥ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | ϕ↔ ϕ,
where p ∈ L0 ranges over the set of atomic formulas. The
formulas of LProp are assigned values from the set T =
{0, 12 , 1}; v(>) = 1 and v(⊥) = 0. The semantics of the
non-atomic formulas according to Łukasiewicz is: v(¬ϕ) =
1− v(ϕ); v(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = min(v(ϕ1), v(ϕ2)); v(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) =
max(v(ϕ1), v(ϕ2)); v(ϕ1 → ϕ2) = min(1, 1 − v(ϕ1) +
v(ϕ2)) and v(ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2) = 1− |v(ϕ1)− v(ϕ2)|.
The semantics according to Kleene is: v(¬ϕ) = 1 −
v(ϕ); v(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = min(v(ϕ1), v(ϕ2)); v(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) =
max(v(ϕ1), v(ϕ2)); with ϕ1 → ϕ2 ≡ ¬ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 and
ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2 ≡ (ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ2 → ϕ1).
The consequence operator for a ternary logic, e.g., |=L and
|=K , is defined in the standard way, [Urquhart, 2001]. Given
a set of formulas Γ ⊂ LProp and a formula ψ ∈ LProp, ψ
is entailed by Γ, if for all assignments v, if v(ψ) = 1 for all
formulas ψ ∈ Γ, then v(ϕ) = 1. A formula ψ for which
∅ |=L ψ is a tautology of the Łukasiewicz logic, if ∅ |=K ψ
then ψ is a tautology of the Kleene logic. If Γ |=L ⊥, then Γ
is inconsistent in the Łukasiewicz logic. If Γ |=K ⊥ then Γ
inconsistent in the Kleene logic. E.g., p → p is a tautology
of the Łukasiewicz logic, but not of the Kleene logic.
The Łukasiewicz logic, together with |=L, is a member of
the set of general logics defined [Dietrich, 2007], thus for this
logic all the impossibility results shown by [Dietrich, 2007]
hold. The Kleeny logic is not a member of this set of general
logics. We give the basic definitions using the Łukasiewicz
logic framework. The definitions using any other ternary
logic framework can be constructed in the same way.
2.2 Judgment aggregation definitions
A judgment aggregation problem is specified by a sequence
of logically related issues called an agenda A. In our frame-
work, the issues are well-formed formulas of LProp. The
logic relations between the agenda issues can also be given
in addition to the agenda, by a set of formulas R. For ex-
ample, in the agenda A = {a1, a1 → a2, a2} the elements
are logically related, but in the well-known judgment ag-
gregation problem, the “doctrinal paradox of [Kornhauser
and Sager, 1993] where A = {a1, a2, a3}, the relations of
the elements are specified by the additional set of formulas
R = {(a1 ∧ a2)↔ a3} is given.
A judgment for issue a ∈ A is a valuation v : LProp 7→
{0, 12 , 1}. Note that by adopting this definition we consider
an abstention as a judgment. Given a set of n agents N , the
judgments rendered by an agent i ∈ N on all m issues of A
is called a judgment sequence Ai ⊆ {0, 12 , 1}m. A(aj) is the
judgment on element aj according to sequence A. We can
always create a judgment set A◦ from a judgment sequence
A, and vice versa. We say that a judgment sequence A cor-
responds to a judgment set A◦ if and only if, for all issues
a ∈ A: a ∈ A◦ if and only if v(a) = 1; ¬a ∈ A◦ if and only
if v(a) = 0; a 6∈ A◦ and ¬a 6∈ A◦ if and only if v(a) = 12 .
It is usually assumed, and we assume it here, that the
judgment sets of all agents are consistent with respect to
R i.e., A◦i ∪ R 6|=L ⊥. The set of all judgment sets
which are consistent with respect to A and R are denoted
by Φ◦(A,R, |=L); the set of its corresponding judgment se-
quences is denoted by Φ(A,R, |=L). When A , R and |=L
are clear we write simply Φ and Φ◦. Any subset of Φ which
satisfies constraints X is denoted Φ↓X . E.g., the subset of Φ
in which all sequences contain only judgments from {0, 1} is
denoted by Φ↓{0,1}.
A profile is a n×mmatrix pi = [pi,j ], pi,j ∈ {0, 12 , 1} con-
taining judgments of all agents i ∈ N over all agenda issues
a ∈ A. If the profile consists only of consistent judgment
sequences, then pi ∈ Φn. A line in the matrix, denoted pii,
corresponds to agent i’s judgment sequence. A column in the
matrix, denoted pij , corresponds to the vector of all judgments
rendered for aj ∈ A.
A judgment aggregation function, for a set of n agents is
a function f : Φn 7→ Φ. A judgment aggregation rule is a
correspondence F : Φn 7→ P(Φ), where P(Φ) is the power
set of Φ. A judgment sequence that is outputted from an ag-
gregation rule is called a collective judgment sequence.
3 Distance-based judgment aggregation
A distance-based judgment aggregation procedure is, accord-
ing to [Endriss et al., 2010], a judgment aggregation rule
DBP : (Φ↓{0,1})n 7→ P(Φ↓{0,1}) defined as:
DBP (pi) = arg minA∈Φ↓{0,1}
∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1 |(A(aj)− pi,j |.
DBP can be generalized, in the style of the belief distance-
based merging operators, see for example [Konieczny et al.,
2004], to a judgment aggregation rule Dd, by replacing the
aggregation function
∑
with a general aggregation function
 and the Hamming distance by some distance d.
An aggregation function  : (R+)n 7→ R+ is any func-
tion that satisfies non-decreasingness, minimality and iden-
tity. The function  is non-decreasing when, if x ≤ y, then
(x1, . . . , x, . . . , xn) ≤ (x1, . . . , y, . . . , xn). It satisfies
minimality when (x1, . . . , xn) has a unique absolute min-
imum k ≥ 0 for x1 = . . . = xn = 0 and identity when
(x, . . . , x) = x. A distance d : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}m 7→ R+
is any total function which, for anyA,A′ ∈ dom(d), satisfies:
d(A,A′) = 0 if and only if A = A′; d(A,A′) = d(A′, A)
and d(A,A′) +d(A′, A′′) ≥ d(A,A′′). The most common
are
∑
and max, while the most common d are the Hamming
distance, and the drastic distance dD. The latter is defined as
dD(A,A
′) = 0 if and only if A = A′, and dD(A,A′) = 1
otherwise.
It is straightforward to extend the rule Dd, to aggregate
three-valued judgment sequences.
Definition 1 The three-valued distance-based judgment ag-
gregation rule ∆d, is a rule ∆d, : Φn 7→ P(Φ) such that:
∆d,(pi) = arg minA∈Φ (d(A, pi1), . . . , d(A, pin)). Where is as an aggregation function and d is a distance.
Apart from the
∑
and the max, we can also use another well
known aggregation function, the product
∏
[Grabisch et al.,
2009], with minor adjustments. We can define the function
∏
as
∏
:
∏n
i=1( + d(A,Ai)), where  ∈ R+. We need to add
the non-null constant  to each distance to avoid multiplying
with zero. Observe that
∏
(x1, . . . , xn) has a unique absolute
minimum in k =  for x1 = · · · = xn = 0.
We give some examples of distance. The drastic dis-
tance dD can be used defined in the same way as for the
case of two-valued judgments. The Hamming distance dH
can be defined as dH(A,A′) =
∑m
i=1 δh(A(ai), A
′(ai))
where δh(x1, x2) = 0 iff x1 = x2; δh(x1, x2) = 1 oth-
erwise. We can use one more well-known distance metric,
the taxicab distance3 dT . The dT is defined as dT (A,A′) =∑m
i=1 |A(ai) − A′(ai)|. As it can be observed, the dT col-
lapses into the dH whenever both the judgment sequences
compared are from Φ↓{0,1}.
3.1 Basic judgment aggregation properties of ∆d,
The basic properties considered for judgment aggregation are
universal domain, anonymity and independence of irrelevant
alternatives(IIA) [List and Polak, 2010]. Universal domain is
satisfied when the domain of the aggregation rule includes Φ.
(IIA) is satisfied when the collective judgment on any aj ∈ A
depends only on pij . Anonymity is satisfied when the collec-
tive judgment set for a profile pi is the same as the the collec-
tive judgment set of any permutation σ(pi).
The properties of universal domain, anonymity and inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives can be extended to apply
to aggregation rules as well. The rule ∆d, satisfies univer-
sal domain by construction. The independence of irrelevant
alternatives does not hold for ∆d, and can be demonstrated
by an example.
Whether ∆d, satisfies anonymity depends only on the se-
lected aggregation function  and not on the choice of dis-
tance. This is because all distances are by definition symmet-
ric functions. ∆d, satisfies anonymity if and only if  is
symmetric. When pi is a profile and pˆi = σ(pi) its permuta-
tion, observe that if pˆi = σ(pi) then (d(Aˆ, pˆi1), . . . , d(Aˆ, pˆin))
is a σ permutation of (d(Aˆ, pi1), . . . , d(Aˆ, pin)), because
d(Aˆ, pii) = d(Aˆ, pˆij) when pii = pˆij . Consequently
∆d,(pi) = ∆d,(pˆi) if and only if (x) = (σ(x)),
x ∈ (R+)n. An aggregation function is symmetric when for
all permutations σ,(x) = (σ(x)) (pg.22, [Grabisch et al.,
2009]).
All the aggregation functions we considered: max,
∑
and∏
are symmetric. Thus ∆d, is symmetric for all pairs of
 ∈ {max,∑,∏}, d ∈ {dD, dH , dT ,m}.
3.2 Distances and judgment-abstention relations
The impact of the abstentions on the collective judgments is
determined by the selection of the distance d. The distance
determines the relation between a judgment sequence with
abstentions and one without. By choosing the Hamming or
the drastic distance, the abstentions are treated as a third op-
tion, an alternative to “yes” and “no”. The Taxicab distance
treats the abstention as a position half-way between “yes” and
3The Taxicab, also known as Manhattan, distance was introduced
by Hermann Minkowski (1864-1909).
“no”. All of these distances allow for the possibility of an
abstention to be part of the collective judgment set. More
“distance” functions can be defined for the abstention to have
a different impact. For example, the function m assigns the
distance zero from any judgment to the third-value judgment,
thus ignoring the abstentions in the profile:
m(A,A′) =
∑m
i=1b|A(ai)−A′(ai)|c.
The function m is not a distance function, but it can be used
to specify a distance-based aggregation rule.
4 ∆d, with weights
To be able to specify weight sensitive aggregation rules, we
need to introduce a new property for the distance functions,
that of granularity.
Definition 2 A distance d is granular, if it can be represented
as d(A,A′) = ~mi=1δ(AOai, A′Oai), where~ is a symmetric
aggregation function with a unique minimum in k = 0.
From the distances we considered, dT and dH are granular,
while dD is not.
A weight is a number wi,j ∈ R+, wi,j ≥ 1, and it de-
notes the relevance of the judgment of agent i on aj ∈ A.
The weight matrix W = [wi,j ]n×m is an input to a weight-
sensitive distance-based aggregation rules.
The weight can be specified by the agent who makes the
judgment or by the agent who aggregates the judgments. Its
meaning is determined by the aggregation context. In con-
texts such as the example for the robot purchase given in the
introduction, the weight is specified by the agent who makes
the judgment and it denotes the relevance the agent assigns to
a particular reason, i.e., issue. An agent can assign a weight to
an agenda element to denote his confidence in his judgment.
Weights can be used to encode the reputation an agent
has regarding particular agenda elements. In this case the
weights are assigned by the agent who aggregates the judg-
ments. We show how weights can be constructed from repu-
tation. Assume that ri,j ∈ [0, 1] is the normalized reputation
of agent i regarding aj ∈ A. To construct the weights is to
set wi,j = 1 + ri,j , thus maintaining that wi,j ≥ 1. When the
reputation of the agent is 0 his weight is 1.
Definition 3 Let dg be a granular distance and W a
weight matrix. A three-valued distance-based judg-
ment aggregation rule with weights ∆d
g,
W is a rule
∆d
g,
W : Φ
n × (R+)n×m 7→ P(Φ) such that:
∆d
g,
W (pi,W ) = arg minA∈Φ ni=1 ~mj=1 wi,j · δ(A(aj), pi,j).
Observe that when an agent has an “untarnished” reputation
ri,j = 1 for an issue, the weighted aggregation rule would
still not treat their judgment as a “veto”. To achieve “veto” of
one agent on an issue, the weights of the remaining agents on
that issue need to be set to zero.
Assuming that we have available only the weight associ-
ated to an agent, we can construct a n × 1 weight vector
w = [wi], wi ≥ 1. A three-valued distance-based judgment
aggregation rule with agent-weights ∆d
g,
w is then defined as
∆d,w (pi,w) = arg minA∈Φ ni=1wi · d(A, pii).
When each agent is an expert on different issues, one may
want to consider an agent’s judgments only on issues in his
area of expertise. The weights can be used to encode sub-
jective agendas, i.e., individually designated agenda subset
Ai. The weights on an agent i are zero for all agenda issues
aj 6∈ Ai.
5 Some more properties
We first consider the relations between the distance-based
judgment aggregation rules we defined. Let F and F ′ be two
judgment aggregation rules defined over domains dom(F )
and dom(F ′) correspondingly. We say that a F is included in
in F ′, denoted F ⊂ F ′, if dom(F ) ∩ dom(F ′) 6= ∅ and for
each pi ∈ dom(F ) ∩ dom(F ′), F (pi) ⊆ F ′(pi).
Proposition 1 The following inclusion relations hold
Dd, ⊂ ∆d, ⊂ ∆d,w , ∆d
g,
w ⊂ ∆d
g,
W and ∆
d, ⊂ ∆d,W .
Proof: Dd, ⊂ ∆d, holds since Φ↓{0,1} ⊂ Φ; ∆d, ⊂
∆d,w holds since we can use the unary vector u =
(1, 1, . . . , 1) to achieve ∆d,(pi,u) = ∆d,w (pi,u). ∆d
g,
w ⊂
∆d
g,
W , because we can always represent ∆
d,
w through ∆
dg,
W
by setting wi,j = vi for all aj ∈ A. We can always represent
the rule ∆d, as a ∆d
g,
W rule by setting wi,j = 1. 
Since ∆d
g,
W subsumes ∆
dg,
w , ∆
dg, and Dd,, we can
use it to aggregate the profiles for sets of agents for which
different types of weights are available.
5.1 Co-domain restrictions
The co-domain of ∆d
g,, ∆d
g,
w and ∆
dg,
W corresponds to
the set Φ◦ of all judgment sets A◦ for A for which A◦ ∪ R
is consistent. Consequently, the selected judgment sequences
may have the undecided judgments in them, and the sequence
in which all judgments are undecided is also a possible out-
come. This might be undesirable, and one may want to allow
only for sequences from {0, 1}m to be in the co-domain of
the aggregation rule.
Ensuring that the aggregate satisfies certain constraints X ,
such as containing only judgments from {0, 1}, can be ac-
complished by restricting co-domain of the rule. The co-
domain restricted ∆d
g,
W can be defined as:
∆d
g,
W (pi,W,X) =
arg minA∈Φ↓X ni=1 ~mj=1 wi,j · δ(A(aj), pi,j).
5.2 The premise-based procedure emulated
Restricting the co-domain can be used to engineer certain
properties for certain issues, such as for example adherence
to majority. A judgment v(a) on a ∈ A adheres to majority,
with respect to a profile pi, if the number ni of agents in pij ,
for which pi,j = v(aj) is greater then the number of agents
nj for which pi,j 6= v(aj); v(a) = 12 when ni = nj .
As we know from the impossibility results of [Dietrich,
2007], a judgment set A in which the collective judgment for
each issue a ∈ A corresponds to the majority judgment in pij
may be such thatA◦∪R |=L ⊥. However, for some subset of
agenda issues, majority-adherence can be consistently guar-
anteed. For example, the premise-based procedure guarantees
majority-adherence to a subset of the agenda called premises.
Given a profile pi, and a subset of selected issues b ∈ A, we
can define Φ↓X to be the subset of Φ in which all judgment
sequences A are such that which A(b) is majority-adherent
with respect to pi.
5.3 General complexity result for distance-based
judgment aggregation
The judgment distance-based winner determination problem
for agendaA, set of rulesR, and a distance-based rule ∆d,,
is defined as follows:
Definition 4 (WinDet for ∆d,)
Input: Profile pi ∈ (Φ(A,R, |=L))n, sequence A ∈
Φ(A,R, |=L).
Output: true iff A ∈ ∆d,(pi).
Proposition 2 If and d are computable in polynomial time
then WinDet for ∆d, is in ΣP2 .
We prove the inclusion by showing an algorithm for WinDet.
Algorithm: WinDet(pi,A)
1. guess a valuation v for the atoms in A;
2. if v is a model for A and not ExistBetter(pi,A)
then return(true) else return(false);
Oracle: ExistBetter(pi,A)
1. guess A′ ∈ {0, 1
2
, 1}m;
2. guess a valuation v′ for the atoms in A;
3. if v′ is a model for A′ and (d(A′, pi1), . . . , d(A′, pin)) >
(d(A, pi1), . . . , d(A, pin)) then return(true) else
return(false);
Two observations are worth pointing out. In the weighted
case, a weight matrix W is also a part of the input. If ~ and
δ are computable in polynomial time wrt the size of pi and
W , then so is d, and the above result can be easily adapted.
Moreover, if the number of possible scores for ∆d,W is known
in advance and bounded by a polynomial in n,m then com-
puting WinDet for ∆d,W is in Θ
P
2 (where Θ
P
2 = P
NP[log n]
is the class of problems solvable by a polynomial-time de-
terministic Turing machine asking at most O(log n) adap-
tive queries to an NP oracle).4 This can be demonstrated by
the following variation of the algorithm. Let V al be the set
of possible scores. Also, for an ordered set X , let med(X)
denote the median of X , X+ denote the subset of X from
med(X) up, and X− the part below med(X).
Algorithm: WinDet(pi,A)
1. Poss := V al;
2. repeat
3. k := med(Poss);
4. if Exist(pi, Poss−)
then Poss := Poss− else Poss := Poss+;
5. until |Poss| = 1;
6. if (d(A, pi1), . . . , d(A, pin)) = med(Poss)
then return(true) else return(false);
Oracle: Exist(pi, Poss)
1. guess A ∈ {0, 1
2
, 1}m and a valuation v;
4We thank an anonymous reviewer for hinting the property and
sketching the proof.
2. if v is a model forA and(d(A, pi1), . . . , d(A, pin)) ∈ Poss
then return(true) else return(false);
Again, the algorithm and the result can be easily adapted
for the weighted case of ∆d,W .
6 Conclusions and future work
The literature on judgment aggregation assumes that all
agents have to give their judgments on all agenda elements,
which seems an important limitation in many scenarios.
Moreover, the agents’ judgments on the same issue must bear
the same weight. In this paper, we make the first step to-
wards filling the gap. Our rules are based on distance mini-
mization, i.e., a rule is specified by an aggregation function
and a distance d. Unlike the weight-sensitive distance-based
aggregation rules studied in the theory of belief merging by
[Revesz, 1995], our weights can be assigned to each pair of
(judgment, agenda element) and not only to agents.
The semantics of abstention is determined by the choice of
the propositional ternary logic. Which semantics to choose
can be determined by the aggregation setting. The relation
of the abstention from judgment to the crisp (yes/no) judg-
ments is determined by the choice of distance d. Formally,
we construct a dual judgment aggregation framework based
on propositional ternary logic. The framework is dual since
we can represent the input from the agents both as subsets of
A = {¬a|a ∈ A} ∪ A, and as a sequence from {0, 12 , 1}m.
We demonstrate the expressive power of our rules by show-
ing how the co-domain can be constrained to ensure collective
judgment sequences with desirable properties.
The worst-case complexity for computing the winner de-
termination problem turns out to be at most ΣP2 in general,
and at most ΘP2 under reasonable conditions. Note that the
specific complexity bounds may depend on the actual choice
of d and . For example, the WinDet problem for the drastic
distance dD can be solved in linear time with respect to the
number of agents and issues. In the future we intend to study
further the properties of different ∆d,W rules with respect to
the choice of (d,).
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